Owner Scorecard


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BATRK, Atlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series C

Entertainment & Studios capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-out

Revenue is Baseball (87%) and Mixed Use Development (13%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
BATRK · Atlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series C
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$732M
+10.5% YoY · 8% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $757M 4-yr avg $656M
Operating margin −1.4% 4-yr avg −5.1%
ROIC −1% 4-yr avg −3%
Owner-earnings margin −13% 4-yr avg −6%
Free cash flow margin −13% 4-yr avg −6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 13% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −6.0% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 11% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Baseball is 87% of revenue, with Mixed Use Development the other meaningful segment at 13%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Baseball87%$635M
  • Mixed Use Development13%$97M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2022–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$589M$641M$663M$732M$757MRevenueRevenue
18%19%19%18%18%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($31M)($46M)($40M)($14M)($10M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−5.2%−7.2%−6.0%−1.8%−1.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
($34M)($125M)($31M)($23M)($22M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$53M$2M$17M$25M($8M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$72M$71M$63M$76M$80MDepreciationDeprec.
$4M$43M($31M)($43M)($85M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$18M$69M$86M$94M$94MCapexCapex
3.0%10.8%13.0%12.8%12.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$36M($67M)($69M)($68M)($102M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.1%−10.5%−10.5%−9.3%−13.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$36M($67M)($69M)($68M)($102M)Free cash flowFCF
6.1%−10.5%−10.5%−9.3%−13.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-3%-4%-3%-1%-1%ROICROIC
-11%-24%-6%-4%-4%Return on equityROE
−11%−24%−6%−4%−4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$151M$125M$110M$100M$135MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$24M$28M$28M$33M$33MReceivablesReceiv.
$55M$73M$64M$43M$86MAccounts payablePayables
($31M)($45M)($36M)($10M)($52M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$267M$218M$179M$159M$225MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$241M$234M$287M$377M$491MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×0.9×0.6×0.4×0.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$176M$176M$176M$176M$176MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7BTotal assetsAssets
$542M$569M$617M$739M$709MTotal debtDebt
$391M$444M$507M$639M$574MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.0×-1.2×-1.0×-0.3×-0.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$300M$529M$524M$526M$519MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.1%2.1%2.5%2.1%2.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
62.5M62.9M63.6M64.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$10.25$10.54$11.51$11.76Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.00$-0.50$-0.37$-0.35EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.08$-1.10$-1.08$-1.58Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.08$-1.10$-1.08$-1.58Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.10$1.37$1.47$1.46Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.45$8.33$8.27$8.06Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
3-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.0%/yr (2-yr)+6.0%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share+15.5%/yr (2-yr)+15.5%/yr (2-yr)
Book value / share−1.1%/yr (2-yr)−1.1%/yr (2-yr)

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income+65.9%
    “Operating income (loss) improved $26.1 million during the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to the prior year, due to the above explanations.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Broadcasting+13.5%
    “Broadcasting revenue increased $22.5 million during the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to the prior year, primarily due to additional streaming rights granted to our regional broadcast partner and contractual rate increases to comparable broadcast obligations.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Retail And Licensing-2.6%
    “Retail and licensing revenue decreased $1.3 million during the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to the prior year, due to the decrease in regular season home game attendance, partially offset by higher league-wide revenue.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2022–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
64Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−1%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($68M)owner earningsvs.($23M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2022FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $23M loss but ($68M) of owner earnings: $45M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($23M)($31M)($125M)($34M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$76M+$63M+$71M+$72M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$16M+$17M+$13M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$43M−$31M+$43M+$4M
Cash from operations$25M$17M$2M$53M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$94M−$86M−$69M−$18M
Owner earnings($68M)($69M)($67M)$36M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-9%-10%-11%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer ($84M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($14M) ÷ interest expense $46M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $100M − debt $739M
    What this means

    Netting $100M of cash and short-term investments against $739M of debt leaves $639M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    4-yr median, range -4%–-1%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($11M) ÷ invested capital $1.2B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    4-yr median margin, range -11%–6%; latest ($68M) = operating cash $25M − maintenance capex $94M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -9% of revenue this year, a -10% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves ($84M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($23M) · cash from operations $25M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.24×
    Expanding
    Capex $94M ÷ depreciation $76M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $732M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.42×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $739M vs ($218M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.94/share (latest year $-0.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2022–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 4
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −6% → −4% (2-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to −4% lately, median −6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2023 · −7.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.6%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$225M
  • Cash & short-term investments$135M
  • Receivables$33M
  • Other current assets$56M
Current liabilities$491M
  • Debt due within a year$216M
  • Accounts payable$86M
  • Other current liabilities$189M
Current ratio0.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.46×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.28×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($266M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$216M due · $135M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway1.3 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+52.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$343Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($931M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$711M$2M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$200Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2022–2025

Over the record, the business generated $97M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$266M · 275%
  • Source of funding−$170M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $170M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $542M to $709M.

  • Net change in share count3.0%

    The diluted count rose from 63M to 64M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Mr. McGuirk$2.2M$1.4M($67M)
2024Mr. McGuirk$4.3M$3.7M($69M)
2024Mr. McGuirk$3.0M$3.9M($69M)
2025Mr. McGuirk$19.9M$18.6M($68M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$16M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Atlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series C is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−9.9% vs −2.2%

    The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −2.2%) and the loss has widened to −9.9% across the last three years, with the latest year at −9.3%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$542M → $709M

    Debt rose from $542M to $709M while owner earnings went from about ($34M) to ($68M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Entertainment & Studios

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FUNCedar Fair$3.1B91%14.2%-19%6%
PLNTPlanet Fitness$1.3B81%28.6%16%20%
SPHRSphere Entertainment Co.$1.2B-21.3%-6%-10%
LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation$1.2B30%11.4%8%4%
MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp.$1.0B-3.4%-3%7%
MSGEMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp.$863M12.6%13%
BATRKAtlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series C$732M-5.6%-3%-10%
PRSUPursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.$452M91%6.3%4%2%
Group median8.9%1%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Atlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series C is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered7%/yr’22→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−13%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Atlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series C (BATRK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BATRK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BATRA its page in the Manual BAX →

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