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BOOT, Boot Barn Holdings

Our product offering is anchored by an extensive selection of western and work boots and is complemented by a wide assortment of coordinating apparel and accessories.

As of March 28, 2026, we operated 539 stores in 49 states, as well as our e-commerce platform, which includes our websites, mobile app, and third-party marketplaces.

Our stores feature a comprehensive assortment of brands and styles, coupled with attentive, knowledgeable store associates.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

BOOT · Boot Barn Holdings

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$2.3B

+17.9% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.3B 5-yr avg $1.8B

Gross margin 38% 5-yr avg 38%

Operating margin 13.3% 5-yr avg 13.8%

ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 22%

Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 7%

Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 33% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 6.0% to 17% — on a steadier 33% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 32% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$630M	$678M	$777M	$846M	$893M	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$2.3B	RevenueRevenue
30%	31%	32%	33%	33%	39%	37%	37%	38%	38%	38%	Gross marginGross mgn
24%	24%	24%	24%	23%	21%	23%	25%	25%	25%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$38M	$46M	$64M	$74M	$86M	$258M	$232M	$198M	$239M	$299M	$299M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
6.0%	6.8%	8.3%	8.7%	9.7%	17.4%	14.0%	11.9%	12.5%	13.3%	13.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$14M	$29M	$39M	$48M	$59M	$192M	$171M	$147M	$181M	$226M	$226M	Net incomeNet inc.
39%	7%	19%	20%	23%	24%	24%	26%	25%	25%	25%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$41M	$44M	$63M	$25M	$156M	$89M	$89M	$236M	$148M	$305M	$305M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$15M	$16M	$18M	$21M	$24M	$27M	$36M	$50M	$62M	$79M	$79M	DepreciationDeprec.
$9M	($3M)	$3M	($49M)	$65M	($140M)	($127M)	$27M	($107M)	($16M)	($16M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$22M	$24M	$28M	$37M	$28M	$60M	$125M	$119M	$148M	$179M	$179M	CapexCapex
3.5%	3.6%	3.5%	4.4%	3.2%	4.1%	7.5%	7.1%	7.8%	7.9%	7.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$27M	$28M	$45M	$4M	$127M	$62M	$53M	$187M	$85M	$226M	$226M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.2%	4.2%	5.8%	0.5%	14.3%	4.1%	3.2%	11.2%	4.5%	10.0%	10.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$19M	$20M	$36M	($12M)	$127M	$28M	($36M)	$117M	($753K)	$126M	$126M	Free cash flowFCF
3.0%	2.9%	4.6%	−1.4%	14.3%	1.9%	−2.2%	7.0%	−0.0%	5.6%	5.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1M	—	$4M	$4M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$4M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
6%	11%	12%	16%	15%	34%	23%	17%	17%	19%	16%	ROICROIC
8%	13%	15%	15%	15%	32%	22%	16%	16%	17%	17%	Return on equityROE
											Balance sheet
$8M	$9M	$17M	$70M	$73M	$21M	$18M	$76M	$70M	$141M	$141M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$4M	$4M	$8M	$12M	$13M	$10M	$13M	$10M	$10M	$15M	$15M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$189M	$211M	$241M	$289M	$276M	$474M	$589M	$599M	$747M	$845M	$845M	InventoryInvent.
$77M	$90M	$105M	$95M	$105M	$131M	$134M	$133M	$134M	$142M	$142M	Accounts payablePayables
$116M	$126M	$144M	$205M	$184M	$353M	$468M	$476M	$623M	$718M	$718M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$224M	$241M	$277M	$385M	$374M	$542M	$669M	$730M	$864M	$1.0B	$1.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$148M	$151M	$152M	$313M	$222M	$336M	$375M	$313M	$353M	$391M	$391M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×	1.6×	1.8×	1.2×	1.7×	1.6×	1.8×	2.3×	2.4×	2.6×	2.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$193M	$193M	$196M	$198M	$198M	$198M	$198M	$198M	$198M	$198M	$198M	GoodwillGoodwill
$566M	$588M	$636M	$925M	$934M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.5B	$2.5B	Total assetsAssets
$192M	$183M	$174M	$109M	$110M	—	—	—	—	—	$258M	Total debtDebt
$183M	$174M	$158M	$39M	$37M	—	—	—	—	—	$117M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$180M	$215M	$264M	$322M	$395M	$600M	$776M	$944M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%	0.3%	0.4%	0.6%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.8%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
26.9M	27.5M	28.8M	29.2M	29.5M	30.4M	30.4M	30.6M	30.8M	30.7M	30.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$23.38	$24.63	$26.96	$28.94	$30.31	$48.97	$54.58	$54.46	$62.10	$73.33	$73.33	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.53	$1.05	$1.35	$1.64	$2.01	$6.33	$5.62	$4.80	$5.88	$7.35	$7.35	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.99	$1.02	$1.56	$0.14	$4.33	$2.03	$1.75	$6.09	$2.76	$7.36	$7.36	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.70	$0.72	$1.24	$-0.41	$4.33	$0.94	$-1.17	$3.83	$-0.02	$4.11	$4.11	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.83	$0.89	$0.96	$1.27	$0.96	$1.99	$4.10	$3.88	$4.82	$5.81	$5.81	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.68	$7.80	$9.17	$11.01	$13.40	$19.73	$25.57	$30.83	$36.75	$42.90	$42.90	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+13.5%/yr	+19.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+25.0%/yr	+11.2%/yr
EPS	+34.0%/yr	+29.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+24.2%/yr	+43.2%/yr
Book value / share	+23.0%/yr	+26.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

31Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

19%low FY2017

Gross margin

38%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.3×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$226Mowner earningsvs.$226Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $226M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $79M it takes just to hold its position. It put $100M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $126M.

Reported net income$226M

Owner earnings$226M · 10% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$226M	$181M	$147M	$171M	$192M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$79M	+$62M	+$50M	+$36M	+$27M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$16M	+$11M	+$13M	+$10M	+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$16M	−$107M	+$27M	−$127M	−$140M
Cash from operations	$305M	$148M	$236M	$89M	$89M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$79M	−$62M	−$50M	−$36M	−$27M
Owner earnings	$226M	$85M	$187M	$53M	$62M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$100M	−$86M	−$69M	−$89M	−$33M
Free cash flow	$126M	($753K)	$117M	($36M)	$28M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	10%	4%	11%	3%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $79M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $100M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer $210M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $106M · 0.4× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $141M − debt $247M

What this means
Netting $141M of cash and short-term investments against $247M of debt leaves $106M owed, about 0.4× a year's operating profit (0.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 186d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 2 + DIO 221 − DPO 37 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 16%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range 6%–34%; 16% latest = NOPAT $225M ÷ invested capital $1.4B

Industry peers: median 16%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 0%–14%; latest $226M = operating cash $305M − maintenance capex $79M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $100M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $126M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves $210M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.35×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $305M ÷ net income $226M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 40%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $91M ÷ Owner Earnings $226M

What this means
Of $226M Owner Earnings, $91M (40%) went back to shareholders, $41M dividends, $50M buybacks. Net of $16M stock comp, the real buyback was about $34M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.27×

Expanding

Capex $179M ÷ depreciation $79M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.65×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $247M vs $643M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +575%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.08/share (latest year $7.44), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $43.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 7% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 13% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +21%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
Worst year 2017 · 6.0% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +1.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“The rapid development and adoption of AI technologies, including AI-driven search tools, may adversely affect our product visibility, competitive position and results of operations.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.0B

Cash & short-term investments$141M
Receivables$15M
Inventory$845M
Other current assets$33M

Current liabilities$391M

Accounts payable$142M
Other current liabilities$249M

Current ratio2.65×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.49×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.36×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$643Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.3× → 2.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($97M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.0B$760M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.0B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'27$109M

'28$134M

'29$127M

'30$119M

'31$111M

later$366M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$109Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$967Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$773Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$247M

Lease obligations (present value)$773M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.0B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.0B, of which the leases are 76%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Mar 28, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$770M · 64%
Buybacks$50M · 4%
Retained (debt / cash)$376M · 31%

Returned to owners$50M
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $50M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $50M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count14.1%
The diluted count rose from 27M to 31M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained13%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $133M, so each retained $1 added about 0.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	John Hazen	$4.5M	$17.7M	$62M
2023	John Hazen	$9.8M	−$3.1M	$53M
2024	John Hazen	$7.0M	$7.4M	$187M
2025	John Hazen	$3.6M	$4.2M	$85M
2025	John Hazen	$5.9M	−$15.2M	$85M
2026	John Hazen	$6.7M	$11.1M	$226M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$16M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Boot Barn Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?14.1%
Diluted shares grew 14.1% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $50M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $5M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FLFoot Locker	$8.0B	32%	7.3%	17%	6%
HBIHanesbrands	$3.5B	38%	9.3%	16%	8%
DBIDesigner Brands Inc.	$2.9B	30%	3.0%	18%	3%
GCOGenesco Inc.	$2.4B	48%	3.6%	6%	4%
BOOTBoot Barn Holdings	$2.3B	35%	10.8%	17%	4%
LELands' End Inc.	$1.3B	42%	2.9%	6%	1%
BKEBuckle	$1.3B	49%	19.2%	113%	17%
SCVLShoe Carnival	$1.1B	33%	5.6%	14%	5%
Group median	—	36%	6.4%	17%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Boot Barn Holdings has delivered.

Boot Barn Holdings’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Boot Barn Holdings earns about $98M on its 4.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($98M) Net of stock comp (−$16M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($226M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+28%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+14%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $126M on 30M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-08; net debt $117M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($179M) runs well above depreciation ($79M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $226M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BOOT against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Boot Barn Holdings (BOOT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BOOT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BOKF its page in the Manual BOW →

Industry order: ← BNED the Specialty Retail chapter CTRN →