Share count
1.6Bpeak FY2025
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GDS, GDS Holdings Limited ADS
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
CN¥11.4B
+10.8% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥11.4B 5-yr avg CN¥9.7B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 6.0% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −23% to 12% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Capital spending runs about 94% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| CN¥1.1B | CN¥1.6B | CN¥2.8B | CN¥4.1B | CN¥5.7B | CN¥7.8B | CN¥9.3B | CN¥9.8B | CN¥10.3B | CN¥11.4B | CN¥11.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 25% | 25% | 22% | 25% | 27% | 23% | 21% | 20% | 22% | 23% | 23% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (CN¥42M) | CN¥82M | CN¥168M | CN¥480M | CN¥673M | CN¥570M | CN¥713M | (CN¥2.2B) | CN¥1.2B | (CN¥56M) | (CN¥56M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −4.0% | 5.1% | 6.0% | 11.6% | 11.7% | 7.3% | 7.7% | −22.6% | 11.2% | −0.5% | −0.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (CN¥276M) | (CN¥327M) | (CN¥430M) | (CN¥442M) | (CN¥669M) | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥1.3B) | (CN¥4.3B) | CN¥3.3B | CN¥959M | CN¥959M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5% | 33% | 33% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| (CN¥129M) | (CN¥168M) | (CN¥13M) | CN¥293M | CN¥321M | CN¥1.2B | CN¥2.8B | CN¥2.1B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥3.4B | CN¥3.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥227M | CN¥378M | CN¥742M | CN¥1.1B | CN¥1.6B | CN¥2.6B | CN¥3.1B | CN¥3.4B | CN¥3.2B | CN¥3.5B | CN¥3.5B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (CN¥80M) | (CN¥219M) | (CN¥324M) | (CN¥407M) | (CN¥648M) | (CN¥224M) | CN¥956M | CN¥3.0B | (CN¥4.6B) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥1.1B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥988M | CN¥1.7B | CN¥4.3B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥8.0B | CN¥9.7B | CN¥5.9B | CN¥3.2B | CN¥3.2B | CN¥4.7B | CN¥4.7B | CapexCapex |
| 93.5% | 106.4% | 152.6% | 110.6% | 140.0% | 124.1% | 63.3% | 32.7% | 30.7% | 41.0% | 41.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (CN¥356M) | (CN¥546M) | (CN¥754M) | (CN¥849M) | (CN¥1.3B) | (CN¥1.4B) | (CN¥311M) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥94M) | (CN¥94M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −33.7% | −33.8% | −27.0% | −20.6% | −23.0% | −18.1% | −3.4% | −11.5% | −11.9% | −0.8% | −0.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥1.9B) | (CN¥4.3B) | (CN¥4.3B) | (CN¥7.7B) | (CN¥8.5B) | (CN¥3.1B) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥1.3B) | (CN¥1.3B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −105.8% | −116.8% | −153.1% | −103.4% | −134.5% | −108.7% | −33.0% | −11.5% | −11.9% | −11.6% | −11.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -1% | — | — | — | — | — | — | -4% | 3% | -0% | -0% | ROICROIC |
| -9% | -7% | -8% | -4% | -3% | -5% | -5% | -23% | 15% | 4% | 4% | Return on equityROE |
| −9% | −7% | −8% | −4% | −3% | −5% | −5% | −23% | 15% | 4% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| CN¥1.8B | CN¥1.9B | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥7.9B | CN¥14.3B | CN¥14.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| CN¥199M | CN¥365M | CN¥537M | CN¥880M | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.7B | CN¥2.4B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥3.0B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥2.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| CN¥514M | CN¥1.1B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.7B | CN¥3.7B | CN¥3.9B | CN¥3.1B | CN¥2.7B | CN¥2.6B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥1.9B | Accounts payablePayables |
| (CN¥315M) | (CN¥746M) | (CN¥971M) | (CN¥796M) | (CN¥2.2B) | (CN¥2.2B) | (CN¥687M) | (CN¥257M) | CN¥429M | CN¥535M | CN¥535M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| CN¥2.2B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥3.0B | CN¥7.1B | CN¥18.3B | CN¥14.5B | CN¥12.0B | CN¥11.0B | CN¥11.6B | CN¥18.5B | CN¥18.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| CN¥1.5B | CN¥2.4B | CN¥3.5B | CN¥4.0B | CN¥7.6B | CN¥13.5B | CN¥10.6B | CN¥8.3B | CN¥9.1B | CN¥7.1B | CN¥7.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.5× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 1.8× | 2.4× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 2.6× | 2.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| CN¥1.3B | CN¥1.6B | CN¥1.8B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥2.6B | CN¥7.1B | CN¥7.1B | CN¥5.9B | CN¥5.9B | CN¥5.2B | CN¥5.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| CN¥8.2B | CN¥13.1B | CN¥20.9B | CN¥31.5B | CN¥57.3B | CN¥71.6B | CN¥74.8B | CN¥74.4B | CN¥73.6B | CN¥80.0B | CN¥80.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| CN¥1.9B | CN¥3.8B | CN¥5.8B | CN¥8.8B | CN¥11.5B | CN¥19.6B | CN¥25.5B | CN¥25.2B | CN¥24.4B | CN¥25.9B | CN¥25.9B | Total debtDebt |
| CN¥87M | CN¥1.9B | CN¥5.8B | CN¥8.8B | CN¥11.5B | CN¥19.6B | CN¥25.5B | CN¥25.2B | CN¥16.6B | CN¥11.6B | CN¥11.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -0.2× | 0.2× | 0.3× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 0.3× | 0.4× | -1.1× | 0.6× | -0.0× | -0.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| CN¥3.0B | CN¥4.5B | CN¥5.5B | CN¥10.3B | CN¥25.6B | CN¥24.5B | CN¥23.0B | CN¥18.9B | CN¥22.5B | CN¥25.8B | CN¥25.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 299M | 785M | 990M | 1.10B | 1.25B | 1.45B | 1.46B | 1.47B | 1.48B | 1.64B | 941M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥3.53 | CN¥2.06 | CN¥2.82 | CN¥3.74 | CN¥4.58 | CN¥5.38 | CN¥6.33 | CN¥6.66 | CN¥7.00 | CN¥6.95 | CN¥12.15 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| CN¥-0.92 | CN¥-0.42 | CN¥-0.43 | CN¥-0.40 | CN¥-0.53 | CN¥-0.82 | CN¥-0.86 | CN¥-2.92 | CN¥2.24 | CN¥0.58 | CN¥1.02 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| CN¥-1.19 | CN¥-0.70 | CN¥-0.76 | CN¥-0.77 | CN¥-1.05 | CN¥-0.97 | CN¥-0.21 | CN¥-0.77 | CN¥-0.83 | CN¥-0.06 | CN¥-0.10 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| CN¥-3.73 | CN¥-2.41 | CN¥-4.32 | CN¥-3.87 | CN¥-6.16 | CN¥-5.85 | CN¥-2.09 | CN¥-0.77 | CN¥-0.83 | CN¥-0.81 | CN¥-1.41 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| CN¥3.30 | CN¥2.19 | CN¥4.30 | CN¥4.13 | CN¥6.41 | CN¥6.68 | CN¥4.01 | CN¥2.18 | CN¥2.15 | CN¥2.85 | CN¥4.98 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| CN¥9.99 | CN¥5.70 | CN¥5.58 | CN¥9.33 | CN¥20.39 | CN¥16.84 | CN¥15.72 | CN¥12.87 | CN¥15.22 | CN¥15.68 | CN¥27.39 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.62 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/1.75 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.8%/yr | +8.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −1.6%/yr | −15.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.1%/yr | −5.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−0%low FY2023
Gross margin
23%low FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
(CN¥94M)owner earningsvs.CN¥959Mnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned (CN¥94M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥3.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥1.2B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (CN¥1.3B).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | CN¥959M | CN¥3.3B | (CN¥4.3B) | (CN¥1.3B) | (CN¥1.2B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥3.5B | +CN¥3.2B | +CN¥3.4B | +CN¥3.1B | +CN¥2.6B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −CN¥1.1B | −CN¥4.6B | +CN¥3.0B | +CN¥956M | −CN¥224M |
| Cash from operations | CN¥3.4B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥2.1B | CN¥2.8B | CN¥1.2B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −CN¥3.5B | −CN¥3.2B | −CN¥3.2B | −CN¥3.1B | −CN¥2.6B |
| Owner earnings | (CN¥94M) | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥311M) | (CN¥1.4B) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −CN¥1.2B | — | — | −CN¥2.7B | −CN¥7.1B |
| Free cash flow | (CN¥1.3B) | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥3.1B) | (CN¥8.5B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -1% | -12% | -12% | -3% | -18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥3.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥1.2B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income (CN¥56M) ÷ interest expense CN¥2.0B
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? CN¥11.6BNet debt against an operating lossCash CN¥14.3B − debt CN¥25.9B
What this means
Netting CN¥14.3B of cash and short-term investments against CN¥25.9B of debt leaves CN¥11.6B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 79 + DIO 0 − DPO 80 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -4%–3%; -0% latest = NOPAT (CN¥37M) ÷ invested capital CN¥37.4BIndustry peers: median -0%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -34%–-1%; latest (CN¥94M) = operating cash CN¥3.4B − maintenance capex CN¥3.5BIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a -21% median across 10 years. It chose to put CN¥1.2B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (CN¥1.3B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops CN¥3.4B ÷ net income CN¥959M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.36×ExpandingCapex CN¥4.7B ÷ depreciation CN¥3.5B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥11.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.60×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · CN¥25.9B vs CN¥11.4B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥-0.00/share (latest year CN¥0.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥15.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 2% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 2% early to −4% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2023 · −22.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsCN¥18.5B
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥14.3B
- ReceivablesCN¥2.5B
- Other current assetsCN¥1.8B
Current liabilitiesCN¥7.1B
- Debt due within a yearCN¥2.5B
- Accounts payableCN¥1.9B
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥2.7B
Current ratio2.60×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.60×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalCN¥11.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cashCN¥2.5B due · CN¥14.3B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥20.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(CN¥33.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥26.0BCN¥110M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥114Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated CN¥11.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- ReinvestedCN¥46.2B · 395%
- Source of funding−CN¥34.5B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran CN¥34.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from CN¥1.9B to CN¥25.9B.
- Net change in share count214.7%
The diluted count rose from 299M to 941M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why GDS Holdings Limited ADS is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?214.7%
Diluted shares grew 214.7% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?CN¥1.9B → CN¥25.9B
Debt rose from CN¥1.9B to CN¥25.9B while owner earnings went from about (CN¥552M) to (CN¥818M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc | $16.4B | 48% | -0.4% | -0% | 8% |
| NOWServiceNow Inc. | $13.3B | 77% | 4.4% | 6% | 30% |
| DXCDXC Technology Company Common Stock | $12.6B | — | 8.0% | 12% | 8% |
| SHOPShopify Inc. | $11.6B | 49% | -1.3% | -0% | 15% |
| GDSGDS Holdings Limited ADS | CN¥11.4B | 23% | 6.7% | -1% | -19% |
| WDAYWorkday Inc. | $9.6B | 99% | -4.7% | -4% | 22% |
| SNAPSnap Inc. | $5.9B | 55% | -32.4% | -24% | -4% |
| APPAppLovin | $5.5B | 70% | 19.6% | 10% | 17% |
| Group median | — | 55% | 2.0% | -0% | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing eight Class”; GDS Holdings Limited ADS reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
GDS Holdings Limited ADS is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered13%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−12%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GDS Holdings Limited ADS (GDS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GDS, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GDHG its page in the Manual GENI →
Industry order: ← GDDY the Software chapter GDYN →