Owner Scorecard


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LLYVK, Liberty Live Holdings, Inc.

Entertainment & Studios diversified UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Liberty Media provides Liberty Live with general and administrative services including legal, tax, accounting, treasury and investor relations support.

The Liberty Live Group paid $25.8 million and $5.2 million during the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively, for shared services and other directly incurred expenses, which are reflected in the consolidated statements of operations in selling, general and administrative expenses.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LLYVK · Liberty Live Holdings, Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$382M
+12.2% YoY
Vital signs · TTM, with 2-yr average
Revenue $399M 2-yr avg $361M
Gross margin 20% 2-yr avg 18%
Operating margin −12.8% 2-yr avg −23.8%
ROIC −1% 2-yr avg −6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Where the revenue and the profit actually come from, and whether the returns are earned by a real advantage or bought with capital. The segment detail in the 10-K is where this one is settled. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($52M) ÷ interest expense $30M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $545M − debt $3.3B
    What this means

    Netting $545M of cash and short-term investments against $3.3B of debt leaves $2.8B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average
    NOPAT ($41M) ÷ invested capital $2.7B (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($87M) · cash from operations ($29M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $382M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.33×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.3B vs ($1.3B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.09/share (latest year $-0.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.53/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$670M
  • Cash & short-term investments$524M
  • Other current assets$146M
Current liabilities$2.2B
  • Debt due within a year$1.8B
  • Accounts payable$9M
  • Other current liabilities$333M
Current ratio0.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.31×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.5B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.8B due · $524M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway24.3 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+35.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 0.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($558M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.6Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$223Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 2-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$246M13% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$205Mover 2 years buying other businesses

$67M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 33% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 2-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Stock-based compensation$6M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Entertainment & Studios

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
WMGWarner Music$6.7B47%9.2%13%9%
TKOTKO Group Holdings Inc.$4.7B17.6%
STUBStubHub Holdings Inc.$1.7B7.8%-73%15%
ACELAccel Entertainment Inc.$1.3B7.7%14%7%
RSIRush Street Interactive Inc.$1.1B32%-19.3%-1%
OSWOneSpaWorld Holdings Limited$961M7.2%12%6%
LLYVKLiberty Live Holdings, Inc.$382M19%-13.5%-1%
SEGSeaport Entertainment Group Inc.$130M-91.7%-18%
Group median32%7.5%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Liberty Live Holdings, Inc. (LLYVK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LLYVK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LLYVA its page in the Manual LMAT →

Industry order: ← LLYVA the Entertainment & Studios chapter LUCK →